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This study examines the influence of abnormal audit fee and auditor switching 
toward opinion shopping in non-financial company listed in Indonesian Stock 
Exchange in 2011-2015. The data were analysed using ordinal logistic 
regression. The results showed that the abnormal audit fee positively influenced 
opinion shopping, as compared to auditor switching which did not have any 
effect. Furthermore, company size, ROA changes, leverage changes, company 
growth; loss and public accounting firm’s (PAF) size were employed as control 
variables in this study. However, only company size, company growth, loss and 
public accounting firm’s (PAF) size had effects on opinion shopping. In 
summary, it is empirically proved that abnormal audit fee affects opinion 
shopping.  	





Independent auditors provide assurance service to improve the reliability and 
quality of information in financial statements that they are strong enough to be 
the basis of appropriate business decisions from stakeholders. The assurance 
an auditor provides for the reliability and quality is reflected on auditor’s opinion. 
In his/her role, he/she has to provide professional audit judgment which will 
affect his/her opinion which in turn will have impact on decisions taken by the 
stakeholders (Syafi’i & Jayanto, 2015). The relationship between auditor and 
management can give rise to a conflict of interest. In a side, an auditor has to 
Nawalin and Syukurillah/SIJDEB, 1(1), 2017, 103-118 	
	 2 
keep his/her independence. However, on the other side, he/she as a business 
entity has to maintain clients’ loyalty. The independence of an auditor is 
questionable since s/he is chosen and paid by the management (Barbadillo et 
al., 2006). 
 
An auditor’s opinion displays the assurance from him/her for the reliability and 
quality of the financial statements. An unqualified auditor’s opinion is an ideal 
and beneficial one for management. When management fails to provide a 
reliable financial statement for unqualified opinion, they might attempt to obtain 
such opinion by means of opinion shopping. Securities Exchange Commission 
(SEC) defines opinion shopping as an attempt to look for an auditor who agrees 
to provide a support the company designed accounting treatments that the 
company can achieve their reports’ objective. The existence of opinion 
shopping is based on the assumption that management object to the auditor’s 
opinion which is not beneficial and on that management has control over 
starting or discontinue contract with public accounting firms  (PAF) (Lennox, 
2002). 
 
In a study conducted by Lennox (2000) in testing opinion prediction received by 
clients if they switch auditor by using data of the United Kingdom (UK), it was 
shown that there was a tendency that clients would switch auditor when the 
probability is higher that the alternate auditor give a more beneficial opinion 
compared to the current one. Furthermore, Chen et al. (2005) and Xie et al. 
(2010) who carried out a study at the stock exchange in China on the influence 
of abnormal audit fee toward the improvement of auditor’s opinion found out 
that there were positive effects. Similar to that, Yuejun’s (2011) study indicates 
that at companies with higher motivation to avoid loss, abnormal audit fee is 
linked with the improvement of auditor’s opinion. 
 
Lu (2006) concluded that auditor switching was the most effective ways for 
opinion shopping, but this finding is still debatable among experts and 
practitioners. The finding from Lennox (2002) shows that some clients have 
tendency to switch auditor in an expectation to receive a better auditor’s 
opinion.  Furthermore, the auditor rotation regulation might be used to support 
opinion shopping by disguising the behavior as abiding to the rotational 
regulation (Choi et al., 2014) 
 
It is still uncommon that studies in opinion shopping are conducted in Indonesia. 
This study tested how abnormal audit fee and auditor switching influence the 
probability of a company to receive unqualified opinion which means that 
opinion shopping takes place. Bernardus & Fitriani (2015) conducted a study on 
the influence of abnormal audit fee toward opinion shopping at companies 
registered at Indonesia Stock Exchange which shows that there was a positive 
influence of abnormal audit fee toward the probability of companies to received 
unqualified opinion and that opinion shopping phenomenon happened in 
Indonesia. 
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The control variables of this study are company size, ROA changes, leverage 
changes, company growth, loss, public accounting firm’s (PAF) size to control 
audit quality, and loss to describe the existence of pressure to management to 
avoid unfavourable auditor’s opinion (Chen et al., 2005). 
 
This study aims at analyzing the influence of abnormal audit fee and auditor 
switching toward opinion shopping at non-financial companies registered at the 
Indonesian Stock Exchange in 2011-2015. The results are expected to 





The agency theory assumes that all individuals act for their own self-interest. 
The assurance given by auditor for financial statements’ reliability and quality is 
reflected in the auditor’s opinion (Bernardus & Fitriany, 2015). The unqualified 
opinion is ideal and favourable for management. When it fails to provide a 
sound financial statements in an effort to received unqualified opinion, it might 
attempt to find a way to keep the opinion. This attempt is called opinion 
shopping. It takes place on negotiation at which the management put pressure 
to the auditor to agree to accounting practices in the company under the threat 
of auditor switching or dismissal 
 
In relation to abnormal audit fee, agency issue reemerges in the relationship of 
public accountant with principal party and agent in which PAF is chosen and 
take action for the interest of principal party but received audit fee from 
management (Bernardus & Fitriany, 2015). PAFs as business entities have a 
dependency in the form of audit fee to maximize profit and to keep loyalty of 
clients amidst the competition in the business. This will make an agreement is 
possible between them. Extremely high or low audit fee could cause an 
uncertainty toward the competence of auditor in applying the current technical 
or professional standard. 
 
In connection with auditor switching, agent is entitled to do auditor switching on 
the basis of disagreement in certain accounting practice. An agent can switch to 
other auditor who can agree with them. In agency theory, it is assumed that 
they will get satisfaction not only from monetary compensation but also from the 
involvement in the agency relationship. With the agreement on the accounting 
practices, it is expected that the auditor provide a favourable opinion. 
 
Audit fee is the payment received by auditor for his/her service to the client 
(syafi’i & Jayanto, 2015). According to Halim (2008) the amount of the fee vary 
depending on factors in auditing process such as size of client’s company, audit 
service complexity, audit risk and the public accountant firm’s reputation. 
 
Institute Akuntan Publik Indonesia (Public Accountant Institute of Indonesia) 
(IAPI) issued a decision letter No. Kep.024/IAPI/II/2008 on 2 July 2008 on the 
policy of Audit Fee decision. It is explained that the guidelines are for all 
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members of Public Accountant Institute of Indonesia who are public accountant 
in deciding the normal amount of audit fee for their professional service. It also 
gives explanation on consideration in deciding audit fee for the firm, i.e. clients’ 
requirement, legal duties and requirements, independence, level of expertise 
and difficulty of work, length of time needed, and the basis of agreed fee. 
 
Abnormal audit fee, either to high or low, as compared to the previous auditor 
will cause doubt on the ability and competence of auditor in applying the current 
technical and professional standards. An exorbitant fee will create auditor 
economic dependence toward client. It describes the extent of economic 
relationship between them. The stronger the economic bond the lower the 
quality of audit, which will corrupt auditor’s independence. (Fitriani et al., 2015) 
 
Choi et al. (2010) describes that abnormal audit fee is the difference between 
paid audit fee with expected normal audit fee for the audit contract. 
Furthermore, Fitriani et al., (2015) explains that the fee is divided into two 
components: normal and abnormal components. Normal audit fee covers 
regular audit cost (e.g. audit team expenses, litigation risk, and normal benefit 
margin. On the other hand abnormal audit fee does not have transparent criteria 
in its decision and is a covered agreement between auditor and client. 
 
Abnormal Audit Fee 
 
Abnormal audit fee is the difference between paid audit fees with expected 
normal audit fee for the audit contract (Choi et al. 2010). Auditor receiving 
exorbitant abnormal audit fee is assumed to possess the incentive to allow the 
client to do an opportunistic profit management. Opinion shopping in form of 
abnormal audit fee is also an incentive for auditor to give unqualified opinion. 
This can affect the independence and objectivity of the auditor, which will cause 
the neglect of the actual financial statements. The higher the abnormal audit 




Auditor switching is the switch of firm or auditor performed by company either 
voluntarily or mandatorily. In his/her service, auditor is required to be 
independent toward the client who, however, pays him/her. The client is also 
entitled to terminate contract with the auditor if the service is considered 
unsatisfactory. Lennox (2000) says that auditor switching is chosen to avoid 
unfavorable opinion. A company is assumed to do opinion shopping when they 
switch auditor if they receive unfavorable opinion. The avoidance of unfavorable 
opinion by auditor switching is under the assumption that the new one is more 
probable to give unqualified opinion. This assumption is based on the situation 
that the new auditor still has a lot to learn about company as compared to the 
one he/she replaces. From the above points, it is concluded that auditor 
switching has a positive influence over the probability that a company to receive 
unqualified opinion. 
 





Population and Sample 
 
In this study the population was 338 companies registered at Indonesian Stock 
Exchange in 2011-2015. The companies taken for sample were required to 
satisfy the following conditions: (1) consistently attached audit fee paid to public 
accountant firm in the annual report in 2011-2015, (2) published the complete 
audited financial statements and it expired on 31 December in Rupiah, (3) kept 
complete data needed by the researchers. Based on the criteria, 21 companies 
were chosen. 
 
Data Collection Technique 
 
Secondary data of audited financial statements and financial statement expired 





This study used ordinal logistic regression model with the following equation: 
 𝑶𝑷 = 𝜶+ 𝜷𝟏𝑨𝑨𝑭𝑬𝑬+ 𝜷𝟐𝑺𝑾𝑰𝑻𝑪𝑯+ 𝜷𝟑𝑺𝑰𝒁𝑬+ 𝜷𝟒𝑫𝑹𝑶𝑨+ 𝜷𝟓𝑫𝑳𝑬𝑽+ 𝜷𝟔𝑮𝑹𝑶𝑾𝑻𝑯+ 𝜷𝟕𝑳𝑶𝑺𝑺+ 𝜷𝟖𝑩𝑰𝑮𝟒+ 𝜺 
 
In which, 
OP  = Auditor’s Opinion in year t 
AAFEE = Abnormal audit fee 
SWITCH = Auditor switching 
SIZE  = Natural Logarithm on total of asset 
DROA  = Change in Return on Assets 
DLEV  = Change in Leverage 
GROWTH = Company growth 
LOSS  = Loss 






Opinion shopping is the binary variable describing opinion of company. In 
accordance with Xie et al. (2010), the variable was measured in ordinal scale 
ranging from 1 (one) to 3 (three) in which scale 1 is going concern opinion, 
scale 2 is unqualified opinion with explanatory language, and scale 3 is 
unqualified opinion. 
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Abnormal Audit Fee 
 
Abnormal audit fee is the difference between paid audit fees with expected 
normal audit fee for the audit contract. As stated by Choi et al. (2010) and 
Bernardus & Fitriani (2015) abnormal audit fee model is as follows: 
 
Abnormal Audit Fee = Factual Audit Fee – Estimated Audit Fee 
 
Estimated audit fee was measured using the following model: 
 AAFEE = β! + β!LNTA+ β!NBS+ β!NGS+ β!INVREC+ β!EMPLOY+ β!LOSSLAG+ β!LEV+ β!ROA+ β!LIQUID+ β!"BIG4+ β!!SHORT_TEN+ β!"BTM+ β!"CHGSALE+ ε 
In which, 
AAFEE = natural logarithm on factual audit fee 
LNTA  = natural logarithm on total of asset  
NBS  = natural logarithm on 1 add to number of business segments  
NGS   = natural logarithm on 1 add to number of geographical segments 
INVREC = inventory and credit divided by asset  
EMPLOY = square root of number of employees  
LOSSLAG = 1 if Net Income period t-1 is negative, 0 others  
LEV  = leverage (total liabilities divided by total asset)  
ROA  = return on assets (net income divided by total asset)  
LIQUID = current assets divided by current liabilities  
BIG4  = 1 if auditor is from Deloitte & Touche, Ernst & Young, KPMG, 
and Price waterhouse Coopers, 0 others 
SHORT_TEN= 1 if audit in first or second audit period, 0 others 
BTM  = book-to-market ratio (book value of equity divided by market 
value of equity) 




Auditor switching is the switch of firm or auditor performed by company either 
voluntarily or mandatorily. Auditor switching is a dummy variable, in which it is 1 
if auditor switching occurred, and 0 if not. 
 
Company Size (SIZE) 
 
Company size was measured using total of company asset. Asset is resource 
controlled by company as a result of past events and from economic benefit in 
the future the company expect to get. Size was measured using natural 
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Difference of Return On Asset (DROA) 
Return On Asset (ROA) is the profitability ratio to measure company ability to 
produce profit with level of return of asset. The change in ROA is between year 
t and t-1. 
 
Equation of DROA:  
𝐷𝑅𝑂𝐴 = 𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒!𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑒𝑡! − 𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒!!!𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑒𝑡!!!  
Difference of Leverage (DLEV) 
 
Leverage is the use of asset and financial resources by company, which spend 
fix expense to increase profit potential for shareholder. Leverage was measured 
using ratio of total debt on total asset. The change in leverage is the difference 
between ration of debt total and asset total. 
 
Equation of DLE: 
 𝐷𝐿𝑒𝑣 = 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐿𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠!𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑒𝑡! − 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐿𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠!!!𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑒𝑡!!!  
 
Company growth (GROWTH) 
 
Company growth (GROWTH) is a control variable to control the effect of 
difference of financial condition and company performance. It was measured by 
growth rate on total of asset. 
 
Equation of Growth: 
 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ = 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑒𝑡! − 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑒𝑡!!!𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑒𝑡!  
LOSS 
 
Loss is a control variable to reflect pressure and incentive on management to 
avoid unfavorable opinion. The loss was measured using dummy variable. It 
was valued 1 if in period t company loss, and 0 if not. 
 
Size of PAF 
 
Size of PAZ was a control variable to reflect quality of audit. The size of PAF 
was measured using dummy variable. It was valued 1 if associated with the big 
four, and 0 if not. 
 




Table 1. Descriptive Statistic of Abnormal Audit Fee, Company Size, Change in 
ROA, Change in Leverage and Company Growth 
 N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
AAFEE 105 -1,3150 ,8186 ,000000 ,3821685 
SIZE 105 26,1089 32,7441 29,704171 1,4803167 
DROA 105 -,2037 ,2382 -,006080 ,0449977 
DLEV 105 -,2579 ,5249 ,020299 ,0940660 
GROWTH 105 -,6103 ,4610 ,101548 ,1401673 
Valid N (listwise) 105     
Source: Output SPSS, 2016 
The mean of abnormal audit fee (AAFEE) is 0,000000 (rounding from 
1,07718397512191E-14), standard deviation is 0,3821, minimum is -1,315 and 
maximum is 0,8186. Furthermore, the mean of SIZE is 29,704, standard 
deviation is 1,4803, minimum is 26,1089 and maximum is 32,7441. The mean 
of DROA is -0,00608, standard deviation is 0,0449977, minimum is -0,2037 and 
maximum is 0,2382. The mean of DLEV is 0,020299, standard deviation is 
0,0940660, minimum is -0,2579 and maximum is 0,5249. The mean of 
GROWTH is 0,101548, standard deviation is 0,1401673, minimum is  -0,6103 
and maximum is 0,4610. The variables of opinion shopping, auditor switching, 
loss and size of PAF were not included in the calculation because of their 



























Table 2. Parameter Estimates 
 Estimate 
Std. 
Error Wald df Sig. 
Threshold [OP = 1] -13,301 5,322 6,246 1 ,012 
[OP = 2] -9,563 5,210 3,370 1 ,066 
Location AAFEE 1,255 ,605 4,306 1 ,038 
SIZE -,373 ,169 4,857 1 ,028 
DROA -6,465 5,033 1,650 1 ,199 
DLEV -2,203 2,627 ,703 1 ,402 
GROWTH 6,269 1,870 11,246 1 ,001 
[SWITCH=0] ,394 ,546 ,521 1 ,470 
[SWITCH=1] 0a     0   
[LOSS=0] 1,565 ,747 4,388 1 ,036 
[LOSS=1] 0a     0   
[BIG4=0] -1,284 ,482 7,097 1 ,008 
[BIG4=1] 0a     0   
   Source: Output SPSS, 2016 
 
Analysis employed in this study was the ordinal logistic regression. The 
parameter estimates was indicated from the result of ordinal logistic regression 
SPSS output in table 2. 
 
Table 2 exhibits the result of testing using ordinal logistic regression at 
significance level of 0.05 (5%). The threshold coefficient value here was not 
interpreted individually, but only by representing the intercept especially the 
point which auditor’s opinion can be predicted into a higher category. Coefficient 
value in ordinal logistic regression is cumulative. The results of the testing are in 
the following ordinal logistic regression equation.   
 
Logit (p1)  =  -13,301 + 1,255 AAFEE + 0,394 SWITCH – 0,373 
SIZE – 6,465 DROA – 2,203 DLEV + 6,269 GROWTH 
+ 1,565 LOSS – 1,284 BIG4 
 
Logit (p1+p2) =  -9,563 + 1,255 AAFEE + 0,394 SWITCH – 0,373 SIZE 
– 6,465 DROA – 2,203 DLEV + 6,269 GROWTH + 
1,565 LOSS – 1,284 BIG4 
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In which p1 is the probability of going concern opinion, p2 is probability of 
unqualified opinion with explanatory language. Based on table 2 with equations 
1 and 2, explanations of every variable is as follows: 
 
Abnormal Audit Fee (AAFEE) 
 
The coefficient for Abnormal audit fee (AAFEE) is 1.255 and significant value 
0.038. To simplify the interpretation of this variable, the probability calculation in 
is shown in table 3. 
 
Table 3. Abnormal Audit Fee parameter on the level of auditor’s opinion 
AAFEE 







Logit Cumulative  - -12,046* -8,308* 
Odds ratio Cumulative - 5,86946E-06** 0,00024647** 
Cumulative Probability  1,000000 0,999994131*** 0,99975359*** 
Category Probability  0,00000587 0,000240538 0,99975359 
       Source: Processed Secondary Data, 2016 
       *) Calculated from threshold coefficient added to AAFEE coefficient  
       **) Exp (logit cumulative)”p 
***) 1/[1+ Exp(logit cumulative)]  
 
Based on table 3, the increase of abnormal audit fee for 1 unit (assuming 0 
value for other variables), will increase the probability of going concern opinion 
by 0.00000587, unqualified opinion with explanatory language by 0.000240538 
and unqualified opinion by 0.99975359. The other interpretation is that the 
increase of 1 unit of abnormal audit fee (assuming 0 value for other variables) 
will increase odd ratio of unqualified opinion by (exp 1.255) 3.508419. The 
significance value is 0.038 < 0,05, indicating that abnormal audit fee 
significantly influence the auditor’s opinion. 
 
Auditor Switching (SWITCH) 
 
The coefficient of Auditor switching (SWITCH) is 0.640 with significance value 
of 0.222. To simplify the interpretation of this variable, its probability calculation 
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Table 4. Auditor Switching Parameter on the level of auditor’s opinion  
SWITCH 








Logit Cumulative - -12,907* -9,170* 
Odds ratio 
Cumulative - 2,48057E-06** 0,00010416** 
Cumulative 
Probability  1,000000 0,999997519*** 0,99989585*** 
Category Probability  0,00000248 0,000101672 0,99989585 
   Source: Processed Secondary Data, 2016 
       *) Calculated from threshold coefficient added to SWITCH coefficient  
       **) Exp(logit cumulative)”p 
       ***) 1/[1+ Exp(logit cumulative)] 
 
Based on table 4, if the company switches PAF (assuming 0 value for other 
variables), the probability of going concern opinion increase by 0.00000248 
unqualified opinion with explanatory language by 0.000101672 and unqualified 
opinion by 0.99989585. The other interpretation is that if the company switch 
PAF (assuming 0 value for other variables), will increase odd ratio of unqualified 
opinion by (exp 0.394) 1.482739. The significance value is 0.470 > 0.05, 




The Influence of Abnormal Audit Fee toward Opinion Shopping 
 
The results of the study using ordinal logistic regression in table 2 show that the 
significance value of abnormal audit fee is 0.038, which is less than 0.05, and 
with coefficient of 1.255. It means that abnormal audit fee has significant 
influence and has positive correlation toward the probabilities of a company to 
receive unqualified opinion. This is consistent with the results of study from 
Chen et al. (2005), Xie et al. (2010) and Yuejun (2011). This also support the 
findings of Bernardus dan Fitriany (2015) who state that opinion shopping has 
taken place in Indonesia which is proven by that abnormal audit fee influence 
the probability of unqualified opinion. 
 
PAF as a business entity has a dependent in the form of audit fee to maximize 
profit and to keep clients’ loyalty in a strict competition of audit market so that in 
this relationship it is possible that auditor make agreement with the 
management. According to Chen et al. (2005), economic pressure provided by 
the management of the company in the form of abnormal audit fee might be a 
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compromise for the auditor’s independency (Choi et al., 2010). As long as it is 
the management who decide the amount of audit fee paid to PAF, the 
management possesses the capacity to manipulate audit results to an extent. 
 
The influence of Auditor Switching toward Opinion 
The ordinal logistic regression analysis on table 2 shows that the significance 
value of auditor switching is 0.470 which is higher that 0.05 and with coefficient 
value of 0.394, this means that auditor switching does not have any significant 
influence toward the probability of a company to receive unqualified opinion. 
This indicates that auditor switching does not influence opinion shopping. This 
finding support the results of study from (Lie & Wu, 2002) and (Wu &Tan, 2005) 
who states that auditor switching does not affect opinion shopping. But this, on 
the other hand, in contrast with Lennox (2000, 2002) who states that a company 
has more probability to receive qualified opinion compared to unqualified 
opinion after auditor switching. 
 
According to Lennox (2000), a company does auditor switching to avoid 
receiving unfavorable auditor’s opinion. The company receiving unfavorable 
opinion can be assumed to be involved in opinion shopping if it switch auditor. 
However, in this study, auditor switching is proven not to have any effects 
toward the probability of a company to received unqualified opinion. This means 
that the company is not proven to have committed an opinion shopping by 
auditor switching. Some reasons that the company does auditor-switching 
covers the following: exorbitant audit fee and needs of a more diverse 
professional service and of higher credibility PAF. 
 
The Influence of Company Size, change in ROA, Change in Leverage, 
Company Growth, Loss and PAF Size toward Opinion Shopping 
 
From table 2 it is known that company size, company growth, loss, and PAF 
size significantly influence auditor’s opinion meanwhile the change in ROA and 
Leverage does not significantly influence the opinion. 
 
In table 2, it is displayed that the significance value of company size is 0.028. It 
is significantly have influence toward unqualified opinion at 5% level. The 
coefficient if this variable is negative. This indicates that company size decrease 
the probability for unqualified opinion. The company size increase the risks for 
the auditor, including audit risk and exposure risk which is more susceptible in 
big company (Bernardus dan Fitriany, 2015). 
The significance value of company growth is 0.002, and it is significant toward 
unqualified opinion at 5% level. The coefficient is positive. This exhibits that 
company growth which is measured by growth rate on total of asset, increase 
the probability of unqualified opinion. An ever-growing company signifies a 
substantive improvement of company operational performance and company’s 
financial condition. 
 
Loss’ significance value is 0.036 toward the unqualified opinion at 5% level with 
positive sign. This means that loss experienced by a company in current year 
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decrease the probability of unqualified opinion. A company’s loss in current year 
will increase audit risks assumed by auditor-to-auditor is extra cautious in audit 
judgment. 
 
Size of PAF’s significance level is 0.008, significant toward unqualified opinion 
at 5% level with negative sign. This means that PAF size, which is measured 
with KAP big four and non-KAP big four decrease the probability of unqualified 
opinion. It indicates that PAF joining the big four has a tendency to be harder to 





Based on the testing of abnormal audit fee and auditor switching toward opinion 
shopping using ordinal logistic regression, it can be concluded that abnormal 
audit fee increase the probability of a company to receive unqualified opinion. 
However, auditor switching does not influence the probability of a company to 
receive unqualified opinion company size. For the control variables, company 
growth, loss, PAF size significantly influence auditor’s opinion. Meanwhile the 
change in ROA and Leverage does not significantly influence the opinion. 
 
The successive researches are expected to use auditor’s opinion classification 
based on the most current audit standard, the SPAP year 2013, which has 
adopted ISA (International Standards on Auditing). This research only studies 
opinion shopping form the perspective of company only, for future researches it 
is expected that it will also see auditor’s perspective. Opinion shopping is an 
interesting topic to be studied, so it is recommended that for other researchers 






Barbadillo, Emiliano Ruiz, Nieves Gomez Aguilar, dan Estibaliz Biedma Lopez. 
2006. Long-term Audit Engagements and Opinion Shopping: Spanish 
Evidence. Accounting Forum, Vol. 30:61-79. 
Bernardus, Louis, dan Fitriany. 2015. Pengaruh Imbal Jasa Audit Abnormal 
Terhadap Opinion Shopping Perusahaan yang Terdaftar dalam Bursa 
Efek Indonesia (The Effect of Abnormal Audit Fee on Opinion Shopping 
in Companies Listed in Indonesia Stock Exchange). In SNA 18. Medan. 
Chen, Charles J. P., Xijia Su, dan Xi Wu. 2005. Abnormal Audit Fees and the 
Improvement of Unfavorable Audit Opinion. China Accounting and 
Finance Review, Vol. 7:1-28. 
Choi, Jong-Hag, et al. 2014. The Effect of Auditor Change Driven by Opinion 
Shopping on Audit Fees and Audit Quality. Paper read at Accounting 
Institute Conference Proceedings 2014, at Korea. 
Nawalin and Syukurillah/SIJDEB, 1(1), 2017, 103-118 	
	 14 
Choi, Jong-Hag, Jeong-Bon Kim, dan Yoonseok Zang. 2010. Do Abnormally 
High Audit Fees Impair Audit Quality? Auditing: A Journal of Practice and 
Theory, Vol. 29 (1):73-97. 
Fitriani, Sylvia Veronica Siregar, dan Viska Anggraita. 2015. Pengaruh Positif 
dan Negatif Abnormar Audit Fee Terhadap Kualitas Audit (The Positive 
and Negative Effect of Abnormal Audit Fee on Audit Quality). In SNA 18. 
Medan. 
Halim, Abdul. 2008. Auditing 1 (Dasar-dasar Audit Laporan Keuangan) (Basics 
of Financial Statements). 4 ed. Yogyakarta: UPP STIM YKPN. 
Lennox, Clive. 2000. Do Companies Successfully Engage in Opinion-
Shopping? Evidence from the UK. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 
Vol. 29:321-337. 
———. 2002. Opinion Shopping and the Role of Audit Committees when Audit 
Firms are Dismissed: The US Experience. The Institute of Chartered 
Accountants Scotland. 
Lie, Sun, dan Xiang Wu. 2002. A Study on Audit Switch: Preliminaryy Evidence 
From China's Capital Market. China Financial and Economic, Vol. 3 (1). 
Lu, Tong. 2006. Does Opinion Shopping Impair Auditor Independence and 
Audit Quality. Journal of Accounting Research, Vol. 44 (8):561-583. 
 
Syafi'i, Tri Alfian, dan Prabowo Yudho Jayanto. 2015. Analisis Faktor-Faktor 
yang Berpengaruh Terhadap Audit Judgement (Analysis Factors that are 
Affecting Audit Judgement). Accounting Analysis Journal, Vol. 4 (4):1-19. 
Wu, Liansheng, dan Liang Tan. 2005. Auditor Switch and The Improvment of 
Audit Opinion. Auditing Research, Vol. 2:34-40. 
Xie, Zanchun, Chun Cai, dan Jianming Ye. 2010. Abnormal Audit Fees and 
Audit Opinion - Further Evidence from China's Capital Market. China 
Journal of Accpunting Research, Vol. 3 (1). 
Yuejun, Tang. 2011. Audit fees, Motivation of Avoiding Loss and Opinion 
Shoppig: Test for Moderating Effect Based on Chinese Stock Market 
from 2001 to 2008. China Finance Review International, Vol. 1 (3):241-
261. 
 
